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SWINBURNE ON SUBSTANCE DUALISM
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University of Massachusetts Amherst
Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain and Free Will is a  tour de force. 
Beginning with basic ontology, Swinburne formulates careful definitions 
that support his mature philosophy. He is well-known for his views on 
free will and substance dualism. In Mind, Brain and Free Will, he revisits 
these issues among others, because he now has ‘deeper and stronger’ 
arguments for his position. Here I want to discuss substance dualism.
The first sentence of the book says that its focus is ‘the nature of 
human beings – whether we are merely complicated machines or souls 
interacting with bodies’1 (Swinburne 2013: 1). Since I  do not believe 
that this dichotomy is exhaustive, I  shall first examine Swinburne’s 
argument for the claim that human beings are ‘souls interacting with 
bodies’, which he interprets as substance dualism. Then, I  shall offer 
a  sketch of a  different view  – my own  – which is materialistic in the 
sense that it makes reference neither to any immaterial concrete objects 
nor to any immaterial properties (whatever that might mean). I do not 
say that my materialistic view is a complete metaphysics, inasmuch as 
that it pertains only to the natural world. I leave it open whether there is 
a supernatural world.
Since I  am going to offer an  alternative to Swinburne’s substance 
dualism, let me begin by enumerating ways in which I  am in full 
agreement with him. I fully agree with Swinburne that it is not the case 
that ‘mental events are merely brain events’, and it is not the case that ‘I am 
the same thing as my body’ (Baker 1995; Baker 2000). With Swinburne, 
1 Since Swinburne begins with a dichotomy between human beings’ being machines 
or souls, and goes on to argue that we are mental substances, I  assume that he takes 
mental substances to be souls (i.e., immaterial substances).
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I reject a Humean theory of causation in favour of a causal-powers view 
(Baker 2007a). And I thoroughly agree with Swinburne’s rejection of the 
principle of the causal closure of the physical (Swinburne 2013: 104-123; 
cf. Baker 2009). Moreover, I also have a ‘simple view’ of personal identity 
(Baker 2012).2 Now to turn to Swinburne.
In Chapter One, Swinburne takes considerable pains to set out his 
ontology. The history of the world is ‘all the events that have occurred, 
are occurring, or will occur’ (Swinburne 2013: 9). Events have as 
constituents substances, properties and times. So, the categories needed 
to tell the whole history of the world – the data of mental and physical 
life – are substance, property and time. Since Swinburne says that ‘we can 
cut up the world into substances in different arbitrary ways and still tell 
the same world story’ (Swinburne 2013: 38), we need a way to determine 
when ‘two referring descriptions pick out the same property, substance 
or whatever’. Two referring descriptions pick out the same property (or 
whatever) if and only if that property ‘can be designated by the same 
informative designator’ (Swinburne 2013: 10). Swinburne’s dualism rests 
on his claim that mental properties and physical properties cannot be 
picked out by the same informative designator. (Swinburne 2013: 69)
I. INFORMATIVE DESIGNATORS
Since Swinburne’s notion of informative designators carries a  lot of 
weight, we face the question of what an  informative designator is. 
Swinburne says:
For a rigid designator of a thing to be an informative designator it must 
be the case that anyone who knows what the word means (that is has the 
linguistic knowledge of how to use it) knows a certain set of conditions 
necessary and sufficient (in any possible world) for a thing to be that thing 
(whether or not he can state those conditions in words).3 (Swinburne 
2013: 12; my emphasis)
2 However, since I  believe in ontological vagueness, I  disagree with Swinburne’s 
account of the history of the world that holds that ‘each substance com[es] into existence 
at a  certain instant’, which in ‘the precise mathematical sense of the word [is] not 
temporally extended’ (Swinburne 2013: 8). This is all the more surprising since he also 
says, ‘All events take time.’ (Swinburne 2013: 148)
3 I assume that the informative-/uninformative-designator distinction applies only to 
rigid designators.
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He elaborates: ‘Two informative designators are logically equivalent if 
and only if they are associated with logically equivalent sets of necessary 
and sufficient conditions.’ (Swinburne 2013: 12) And mental properties 
are not identical to physical properties because their informative 
designators are not logically equivalent. (Swinburne 2013: 68)
Swinburne gives some examples: ‘Red’ is an informative designator, 
he says, because anyone who knows what the word means can apply 
it correctly if she is favourably positioned with faculties in working 
order and not subject to illusion. By contrast  – another example of 
Swinburne’s – ‘water’ (as used in the 18th century) was an uninformative 
designator of the property of being H2O because ‘however favourably 
positioned you are and however well your faculties are working you 
may not be able to identify correctly some liquid not in our rivers and 
seas as water’ (Swinburne 2013: 12). However, as used today, ‘water’ 
is an  informative designator. Swinburne comments: ‘Whether or not 
a word is an informative designator is a matter of the rules for its current 
use in the language.’ (Swinburne 2013: 14)
The distinction between informative and uninformative designators 
is important for Swinburne, not only because it is used to individuate 
properties, but also it figures in a restriction on telling the whole story 
of the world: We must specify the events that make up the history of the 
world in terms of properties and substances picked out by informative 
designators. Because ‘such designators will pick out the same properties 
and so on [if and only if] they are logically equivalent’, this restriction 
enables us ‘to tell the whole history of the world ... by listing a subset of 
events which entails all events’ (Swinburne 2013: 23).
Let us now turn to some potential problems with Swinburne’s 
characterization of an  informative designator in terms of a  speaker’s 
knowledge of a  set of necessary and sufficient conditions for its 
application.
First, Swinburne says, ‘My knowledge of how to use “I”  ... means 
that I know the nature of what I am talking about when I use the word.’ 
(Swinburne 2013: 158) Later, Swinburne argues that it is the nature of 
a human person to be a mental (immaterial) substance. And what’s true 
for me about my use of ‘I’ is true for everyone who uses ‘I’. (Swinburne 
2013: 158) Surely, if one’s knowledge of how to use ‘I’ meant that one 
knew ‘the nature of what [one is] talking about’, then on Swinburne’s view, 
everyone who used ‘I’, should know that she was a mental substance. But 
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that is clearly wrong. I (LB) can use ‘I’ competently, but I do not believe 
that I am a mental (i.e., immaterial – see note 1) subject.
Second, I have the linguistic knowledge of how to use ‘arthritis’, but 
I do not know ‘a certain set of necessary and sufficient conditions (in 
any possible world) for a thing to be’ arthritis – even though I know that 
arthritis is some painful condition of the joints. I don’t even know any 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a  thing to be red (Swinburne’s 
example of an informative designator). Is a reddish-orange poppy red? Is 
a reddish-yellow bruise red? Of the words that I use competently, there 
are not many (if any) for which I  know any necessary and sufficient 
conditions. (cf. Merricks 1998)
Third, Swinburne’s characterization of informative designators not 
only leaves indeterminacies that are relative to ‘the rules for its current use 
in language’, as in the case of ‘red’; but his characterization also relativizes 
an  informative designator to a  speaker’s current knowledge. A  young 
child can competently use ‘water’ (in its current usage) without knowing 
that water is H2O; so in the child’s mouth, ‘water’ is an uninformative 
designator; but in the mouth of her mother, who knows that water is 
H2O, ‘water’ is an informative designator. It follows that, on Swinburne’s 
characterization, a single term can be used competently by two people 
at the same time in the same linguistic community, and in one case it is 
an uninformative designator and in the other case it is an informative 
designator. The relativity of a  word’s being an  informative designator, 
not only to time but also to speaker, seems to vitiate the usefulness of 
informative designators for telling the whole story of the world.
Swinburne does say that an informative designator is such that anyone 
who ‘has the linguistic knowledge of how to use it’ knows a certain set 
of conditions necessary and sufficient for its application, ‘whether or not 
he can state those conditions in words’ (Swinburne 2013: 12). In all of 
my examples  – e.g., ‘red’, ‘I’, ‘arthritis’  – the speaker has the linguistic 
knowledge of how to use a term without knowing, even in some implicit 
way, any necessary and sufficient conditions for the term’s application.
In sum, if neither ‘red’, nor ‘I’, nor ‘arthritis’ is an  informative 
designator, and if ‘water’’s being an informative designator is relative, not 
only to time, but also to speaker, it is difficult to see that there are any 
informative designators – certainly not enough to tell the whole story of 
the world – on Swinburne’s characterization. Hence, Swinburne’s notion 
of an informative designator does not seem up to the task of picking out 
all the properties needed to tell the history of the world.
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II. IDENTITY CRITERIA FOR COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES
Swinburne has a principle of identity for composites. (Composites are 
substances with parts – like human organisms and artefacts.) One way 
to express his principle is that ‘there is no more to any substance than its 
parts (e.g., fundamental particles) and the way those parts are arranged’ 
(Swinburne 2013: 35). Swinburne says that our normal criteria for the 
identity of a ship over time in terms of parts are too vague to resolve the 
‘ship of Theseus’ puzzle. We can make them more precise, Swinburne 
says, in either of two ways: the continuity of planks arranged in a certain 
way determines the identity of the ship; or the identity of the planks 
determines the identity of the ship.  ‘We can tell the story either way 
without anything being omitted.’ (Swinburne 2013: 31)
Can this claim about the ship of Theseus really be true, on Swinburne’s 
view? It may make a difference in the history of the world which ship is 
the original ship after the change of planks – the ship with reassembled 
old planks or the ship with the new planks. To see this, suppose that, 
although the original ship was owned by Theseus, the replacement 
planks were owned by Minos. If we said that the continuously-existing 
ship was the ship of Theseus, then Theseus would own a ship all of whose 
planks were owned by Minos. If the original ship of Theseus had been 
insured, then there would be a difference in which resulting ship ended 
up insured. If an insurance claim were filed, which ship was identical to 
the ship of Theseus would make a difference in the history of the world. 
So, we couldn’t tell the story ‘either way without anything being omitted’.
Swinburne holds that we can tell the history of the world with stories 
in terms of fundamental particles, and also with stories in terms of 
‘organisms and artefacts’ (and, I assume, mental substances). (Swinburne 
2013: 32) However, if substances are no more than their parts in certain 
arrangements, it seems to follow that artefacts cannot be substances. 
The exclusion of artefacts as substances so construed can be illustrated 
by a fanciful example of two (non-identical) kinds of artefacts made of 
duplicate qualitatively identical parts arranged in the same way: Suppose 
that someone invented a device that mixed water and air and was used 
in a process of making soft drinks; call the device a ‘drinkalator’. Suppose 
that it turned out that exactly the same physically possible structures that 
could be drinkalators could also be carburettors. But drinkalators are not 
identical to carburettors, which mix gasoline and air in automobiles; both 
types of artefacts are distinguished by the intentions and practices of the 
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designers, manufacturers, and users. The identity of an  artefact is not 
determined by its parts and their arrangement: ‘X is a carburettor’ and 
‘X is a drinkalator’ have different truth conditions. (Baker 1995: 195–99) 
No carburettor is identical to a  drinkalator. So, either carburettors 
and drinkalators  – and artefacts generally  – fail to be substances or 
Swinburne’s principle of the identity of composites is incorrect.
Other terminological matters: Swinburne defines a mental property 
‘as one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily has privileged 
access on all occasions of its instantiation’ (Swinburne 2013: 67). And 
‘A  mental substance is one for which the possession of some mental 
property is essential’ (Swinburne 2013: 43). A  physical property is 
defined ‘as one to whose instantiation in it a substance necessarily has 
no privileged access on any occasion of its instantiation’ (Swinburne 
2013: 68). A pure mental property is defined as one ‘whose instantiation 
in a  substance does not entail the instantiation of any metaphysically 
contingent physical property in that substance’ (Swinburne 2013: 68).
I  shall construe the definition of a  mental property to be logically 
equivalent to this (which seems to me slightly easier to understand): 
A  mental property is one to whose instantiations a  substance that 
instantiates it has privileged access  – i.e., substances have privileged 
access to the mental properties that they instantiate.
III. SWINBURNE’S ARGUMENTS FOR SUBSTANCE DUALISM
I am not confident that I understand Swinburne’s argument for mental 
substances from synchronic unity, but if I do, it goes like this:4
(1) A complete history of the world must include ‘among substances 
with physical properties and so physical parts, substances which 
are such that events in those parts are the immediate causes or 
effects of and only of conscious events which are coexperienced 
with other conscious events belonging to the same substance’ 
(Swinburne 2013: 143).
(2) The property of coexperiencing certain properties at a time ‘will 
delimit the physical boundaries of the substance, and so help to 
determine which physical properties it possesses’ (Swinburne 
2013: 143).
4 Swinburne 2013: 43. This is Swinburne’s argument from the synchronic unity of 
a person. If the argument is sound, it establishes substance dualism.
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(3) The property of coexperiencing certain properties at a  time is 
a  mental property. [Defn. of mental property plus the fact that 
one has privileged access to instantiations of coexperiencing.]
(4) If (2) and (3), then ‘a substance which has conscious coexperienced 
properties is ... determined in part by a  mental property’ 
(Swinburne 2013: 143).
(5) If a substance which has conscious coexperienced properties is ... 
determined in part by a mental property, then that substance is 
a mental substance. [alternative definition of mental property]
(6) Humans ‘are mental substances, since their spatial boundaries are 
determined by a mental property’ (Swinburne 2013: 144).
I have a worry about (2), and consequently about (5) and (6). First (2): 
I  wonder if ‘delimit’ is used equivocally. (2) may be true if ‘delimit’ is 
a  causal idea, as in interactive dualism; but in order to support (5), 
Swinburne needs a stronger ontological reading of (4). Determination 
is an ontological idea, not merely a causal one. If coexperiencing certain 
properties at a  time will ‘help to determine which physical properties 
it possesses’, then the connection between the coexperiencing and the 
physical properties that the coexperiencing helps to determine must be 
stronger than merely causal.
To put it another way, (2) is true only if ‘delimit’ is understood 
causally; but if ‘delimit’ is understood causally, then (2) does not support 
the conclusion (6). So, either the argument has a  false premise or is 
invalid. Either way, it is unsound.
Does Swinburne’s argument from diachronic unity of a person fare 
any better? What follows is my best idea of how the argument goes 
(again, I am uncertain):
(1) My use of the word ‘I’ is as an informative designator. (Swinburne 
2013: 158)
(2) If (1), then ‘I know the nature of what I am talking about when 
I use the word’ ‘I’. (Swinburne 2013: 158)
(3) What’s true for me about my use of ‘I’ is true for everyone who 
uses ‘I’. (Swinburne 2013: 158)
(4) If (2) and (3), then ‘[e]ach of us ... can continue to exist without 
any continuity of brain, memory or character’. (i.e., The ‘simple 
theory of personal identity is correct’.) (Swinburne 2013: 158)
(5) If each of us ... can continue to exist without any continuity of 
brain, memory or character, then each of us is a ‘particular subject 
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of experiences (that is, of conscious events), and so a  mental 
substance who exists over time’ (Swinburne 2013: 159).
(6) Each of us is a  ‘particular subject of experiences (that is, of 
conscious events)’.
(7) If (6), then each of us is a ‘particular mental substance who exists 
over time.’ [Swinburne 2013, 159–60]
(8) Each of us is a ‘particular mental substance who exists over time’ 
(Swinburne 2013: 160).
The main problem with this argument, I  think, is that the truth 
of (7) requires that subjects of experience are mental (immaterial) 
substances – the conclusion of the argument from synchronic identity, 
which we found to be unsound. (I criticized premise (1) in the section on 
Informative Designators.)
To sum up, there seem to be difficulties with the application of 
informative designators to the individuation of properties, with the 
application of Swinburne’s criteria of identity for substances to the ship-
of-Theseus case, and with his principle of the identity of composites. 
Moreover, neither the argument from synchronic unity nor the argument 
from diachronic unity for substance dualism seems sound. In light of 
these at least provisional problems, it seems that a view of persons that 
does not countenance mental substances, but satisfies first-personal 
desiderata for persons should be a contender.
IV. A CONSTITUTION VIEW OF PERSONS
Since I intend this discussion to focus on Swinburne, I shall sketch my 
alternative only briefly.
On my view a  person has a  first-person perspective essentially, 
and a  human person is embodied essentially, although she does not 
necessarily have the body she has now. The first-person perspective is 
a  dispositional property that has two stages: a  rudimentary stage that 
human infants share with higher nonhuman animals, and a robust stage 
that human persons develop as they learn a  language. (For details see 
Baker 2013.)
The relation between a person and her body is constitution. Every 
concrete object that exists is of some primary kind or other, and has 
its primary-kind property essentially. Person is a primary kind; teacher 
is not. Constitution is a contingent relation of unity between things of 
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different primary kinds. Human persons begin existence constituted 
by human organisms that support first-person perspectives. (Later, 
with enough bionic replacements, a  human person may come to 
have a  nonorganic body, but the person is always embodied as long 
as she exists.) The unity of persons, and of much else, is provided by 
constitution and the first-person perspective. (For details, see Baker 
2007b; Baker 2007a; Baker 2013)
Persons are of different primary kinds from bodies, human or 
otherwise. (Persons have first-person persistence conditions; bodies 
do not. Persons have innumerable causal powers that bodies lack.) 
Nevertheless, my view is not a property dualism. On my view, there are 
not two kinds of properties; there are myriads of kinds of properties, 
none of which is instantiable only by immaterial substances. (I do not 
believe that there are any finite immaterial substances.)
My view is nonreductive throughout. I  am as nonreductive about 
artefacts as I am about natural objects: ‘Every thing is what it is and not 
another thing’, and that goes for the familiar things that we interact with.5 
Being a dialysis machine is as irreducible (and hence as much are part of 
basic ontology) as being a person or being a human organism.
Hence, the relevant charge against me is not property dualism; a better 
criticism is that my ontology includes too many concrete objects and 
properties, that my ontology is bloated. I accept the charge as the price 
for being nonreductive. So, I am no dualist; I don’t stop at two kinds of 
substances or properties.
One advantage of the Constitution View over Substance Dualism is 
that there is not (or rather I cannot think of) any naturalistic way that 
an  immaterial mind could have come into existence, but I  can think 
of a naturalistic way that the first-person perspective could have come 
into existence: the rudimentary stage of the first-person perspective – 
consciousness and intentionality – seems to have evolved gradually over 
many species (from the first stirrings of intentionality in organisms 
with limited flexibility in responding to their environments to the more 
developed intentionality of mammals);6 and the robust stage comes into 
existence as human beings developed syntactically complex languages 
with resources for first-person reference and attribution of first-person 
5 The quotation is attributed to Joseph Butler.
6 I  think that there is no doubt that dogs behave intentionally and are conscious, 
Descartes notwithstanding.
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reference. There are thus nonmagical explanations for both stages of the 
first-person perspective.
Finally, I  reject any claim (like Swinburne’s) that objects should be 
understood in terms of their parts. The identity and arrangement of 
parts do not always (or even usually) determine the identity of wholes. 
Artefacts and artworks are ontologically intention-dependent; in the 
absence of intentions (of designers, manufacturers, users, artists), there 
could be no artefacts or artworks. Even if indiscernible duplicates of, say, 
dialysis machines spontaneously coalesced in outer space, such objects 
would not be dialysis machines. Dialysis machines are the things they are 
because they have the intended function to replace lost kidney-function 
artificially; machines with such intended functions could not exist in the 
absence of laboratories and medical practices. When we focus on parts 
and their arrangement, what is essential becomes invisible.
Despite my differences with Swinburne, I believe that he and I share 
certain desiderata in our theories about human persons:
(a) A human person is not identical to her body at any time.
(b) A human person can survive a complete change of body.
(c) Not all truths about persons are truths about bodies.
(d) The property of being a person entails the instantiation of mental 
properties – at least a rudimentary first-person perspective.
(e) The persistence of persons is primitive (as the Simple Theory of 
Personal Identity over time implies).
V. CONCLUSION
Mind, Brain and Free Will is a closely argued comprehensive work on 
major themes of Swinburne’s. I  have discussed only a  few aspects of 
Swinburne’s views bearing on substance dualism. In the belief that we 
can (and should) reject the dichotomy that Swinburne began his book 
with – that human beings are either ‘merely complicated machines or 
souls interacting with bodies’  – I  offered an  alternative that I  believe 
achieves much of what substance dualists want.
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